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TRADE POLICY: "INSTITUTIONAL" VS. "ECONOMIC" FACTORS
1.  The Topic
The ongoing discussion of U.S.-Japanese trade relations suggests that national
differences such as in the institutional environment may be relevant for assessing international
trade policies.  However, economic trade theory often assumes countries to be organized
around common notions of complete markets. In contrast, political scientists often concentrate
on national differences without taking the results of economic trade theory into account.  This
paper compares these two alternative modes of trade policy analysis by juxtaposing the
“economic” view inherent in Gene Grossman’s work on “Japan’s Innovation and Trade” with
the “political” view of “Japanese-American Relations” expressed by Chalmers Johnson.  A
synthesis is attempted with the help of some remarks on “New Trade Theory’s Implications
for Policy Analysis” by John Pomery.
According to Joan Robinson, "there is no branch in economics in which there is a
wider gap between orthodox doctrine and actual problems than in the theory of international
trade."
1  Robinson made her statement in 1970, based on the trade theory then practiced.
Today, as then, many of her colleagues would doubt that such a gap exists.  Many
contemporary economists, while admitting the validity of her complaint back then, would
argue that this gap has largely been bridged by advancements in exactly that type of economics
that she criticizes.  As we shall see later, Gene Grossman could be characterized as such an
economist.  Other critics of economic trade theory come from outside the profession.
Chalmers Johnson, for example, excuses his attacks on economists' analyses with being a
political scientist himself, but proceeds to urge his readers to discount or ignore the opinion of
mainstream economists.
2
The non-academic discussion of trade relations has also been rather heated.  A
selective overview of the non-academic discussion of U. S. - Japanese trade relations will give2
some impressions of the variety of public opinions.  This also constitutes evidence typically
taken more into account by political scientists than by economists.
2.  An Overview
Trade imbalances between the U.S. and Japan have been repeatedly the focus of public
and academic discussion in the U.S.  The analyses obtained and resulting policy prescriptions
range from Japan as an economic role model for the U.S. to demands to "get tough" on Japan
for "not abiding by the rules".  Not surprisingly, most commentators on U.S.-Japanese
economic relations do not differ much in their assessment of the economic facts of trade
imbalances, but on the underlying causes.  These differences, in turn, lead to different
assessments of the reality observed and to different policy prescriptions.
A selective sample gives some hints of the diversity in opinion.  Lee Iacocca implicitly
describes Japan as Neo-Mercantilists, though without using this term
3, by stating:
"The Japanese game plan is simple: take in American raw materials but not finished
goods, because that would cost them jobs."
He offers the following solution:
"We have to freeze our deficit with Japan in place, and tell the Japanese to take it
down by a good amount, such as 20 percent per year, until we balance it.
4
The President of the German Congress of Industry and Trade, Hans Peter Stihl
5, however,
opposes the opinion that Japan closes her markets for imports:
"Of course, there will always be specific problems but open access to Japanese markets
is [already] largely achieved."
6
The Wall Street Journal's Alan Murray differentiates between U.S. and Japanese Industry by
stating:
"... Japanese multinational companies don't act like other multinational companies
when they go overseas.  ...  they are far more likely to give most of their business to
other Japanese companies."3
Murray also concludes:
"Together, the evidence shows clearly that the behavior of Japanese multinationals is
an exception in world commerce.  And if the world's trading system is going to stay
together, that behavior must change."
According to Murray's colleague Michael Granfield, even the IRS thinks along these lines and,
consequently, "takes up protectionism."  Granfield alleges that the IRS operates under the
assumption that Japanese multinationals operating in the U. S. move an unfair share of profits
to their home country to avoid U. S. taxation.  Hence, regulation was proposed to establish a
minimum tax, based on average revenues of U. S. firms, that all foreign multinationals will
pay.  Still these differences in assessing underlying causes are not the root cause of
disagreements.  These disagreements possibly stem from a combination of normative
conceptions of what "fair trade should be" and awareness of "who gains and loses" under
alternative arrangements.  According to Murray, the former U.S. administration was  in
principle a proponent of free trade.  He states:
"[P]resident [Bush] doesn't like to talk about managed trade for ideological reasons.  It
suggests that the government has a role in determining trade flows."
Still, he identifies the U. S. - Japanese auto parts agreement from January 1992 as a clear
example of managed trade:
"Make no mistake about it: The Trade agreements that President Bush brought home
from his ill-fated trip to Japan are a clear example of 'managed trade'.  The President
and his people don't like to admit that."
The current administration under President Clinton is also partial towards managing trade with
Japan.
7  Lee Iacocca expresses an opinion similar to Murray's about Congress when stating
that legislators would rather be regarded as "perverts than as protectionists."
8  Hans Peter Stihl
also addresses free trade.  However, he is strictly opposed to the U. S. - Japanese auto parts
agreement.  He calls it:
"... a violation of the regulations of GATT and a discrimination against other countries.
This is not acceptable for German industry and [therefore] needs political
clarification."4
However, in comparing the positions of American and German proponents of free trade, some
additional facts merit consideration.  The U. S. has a chronic trade deficit with Japan
9, roughly
4-5 times the size of the trade deficit with the European Community as a whole.  A major part
of this deficit is due to trade in automobiles.  Germany has an overall trade surplus, but a
small trade deficit in automobile trade with Japan of approximately $1 billion
10.  Mr. Stihl's
own business belongs to the market leaders for power saws in Japan.
Notwithstanding different direct interests in a specific trade issue, the question about
whether Japanese firms (and consumers) "act differently" seems  to lead to a core aspect of the
problem.  Powell (1992) offers the opinion that not only Japanese firms, but also Japanese
private investors and consumers act inherently different from their American counterparts.
However, he predicts a movement toward more "American" behavior patterns in Japan.  He
lists as some of the "cornerstones of the country's economic miracle" that might now be
endangered:
"stable shareholding arrangements that secure 'patient' capital for companies to invest;
strategic emphasis on market share and not profits; lifetime employment for
employees, and complete disdain for 'shareholder rights.'"
He also argues that the Japanese work culture is presently in a state of transformation, and that
Japanese shareholders have begun to change their expectations with respect to dividend
payouts.  Until recently, institutional, interlocking share ownerships (keiretsu) have provided
for stable, inexpensive capital.  For Powell, these cornerstones, and especially the ability to
secure long-term capital with low dividend payments, made the basis for Japan's relative
success in world markets.  He states, for example:
"One result [of keiretsu] was that Japanese managers were spared the pressure to earn
the high returns on invested equity required of their American counterparts."
Powell's bottom line conclusion is that changed shareholder, worker and consumer awareness
will force Japanese industry to act more like their American counterparts.  In a sense, the
"solution" being that Japan, after all, will become more American, will be forced to "play by
the rules."5
What appears above as the question whether "Japanese are different or not" constitutes
a question about adequate analysis for the trade theorist.  The remainder of the paper will take
a look at two different types of analysis, labeled as "economic" and as "political."  This is
concluded by an attempt to point the direction toward a possible reconciliation of these two
views.  The following discussion will also be exemplary with respect to the theoretical view
points and the literature covered.  The focus will be on Grossman (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1990) who apply contemporary mainstream economic theory to the case of Japan,
on Johnson (1991) who proposes political-historical determinants of Japanese economic
development and policies, and on Pomery (1990) who considers the choice of scientific
method as part of the economist's problem.
3.  An "Economic" View
The notion, that there is one common set of axiomatic elements with which to describe
economic activity in different countries and that eventually every region must follow the rules
of a free market in which the "direction of the economy is determined by the independent
actions of consumers and corporations all operating to maximize their profits and income"
11 is
widespread among the economic profession.  It is also taught to students of economics from
the very beginning.  For example, Ethier (1988) states in an introductory text on international
economics
12:
"The basic pattern of Japanese trade in manufactured goods seems mostly determined
by economic fundamentals, not by Japanese trade policies."
In a sense, this is of course correct, since short-term trade policies do not normally exert the
main influence on long-term developments.  However, the so called "economic fundamentals"
merit additional attention, since they may very well be the outcome of specific policies
themselves.  We will continue the discussion of economic fundamentals below, following a
short introduction into contemporary economic theory.6
Daniel Fusfeld describes contemporary economic thought as being dominated by the
New Neoclassical doctrine.  He characterizes New Neoclassics as the economic dimension of
a newly emerged conservatism, which returned to "the conceptual framework of Adam Smith
and the economic liberals of the eighteenth century:  the market is self-adjusting, leads to
socially desirable outcomes, and could benefit from substantial returns to laissez-faire."
13  He
continues by stating that "[o]ne underpinning of the [New Neoclassical] theory is the idea of
'rational expectations.'"  The reference to Adam Smith allows for directly attributing some
well-known properties to the New Neoclassical model.  Its philosophy is one of a naturally
occurring harmonic (good, desirable) equilibrium.  Sociologically, it is characterized by
independently acting, individual competitors and consumers.  The driving psychological force
behind economic actors is egotism, possibly softened by compassion or sympathy for others.
"Rational expectations" serve to further back up the confidence in the emergence of a
philosophically desirable outcome, while further defining sociological and psychological
characteristics.  In its political dimension, New Neoclassical theory is firmly rooted in
parliamentary democracy as the guarantor of social consensus on private property rights and
capitalism.  Its policy prescriptions are either laissez-faire or supply-side oriented (pro-
business).  Put in other terms, New Neoclassical theory can also be characterized on the
macroeconomic level.  Felderer and Homburg state that "New Classical economists perceive
the business cycle as an equilibrium phenomenon:  as a process in which markets are cleared
at any instant and expectations are Rational."
14  Again, this definition implies the political
advocacy of laissez-faire.  However, a survey of current research indicates that contemporary
economics cannot consist alone of the type of New Neoclassical economics described above.
A substantial part of that research could be characterized as Neokeynesian in that it does not
"insist on permanent market clearance" while still being "based on individual optimization
behaviour."
15  But this division into only two distinct schools of thought leaves the attentive
student of economics in a dilemma.  The question remains how to classify those authors that
are New Neoclassical in the choice of their model design (including guaranteed market
clearing) but produce results that are largely incompatible with a laissez-faire policy
prescription.  In my opinion, this kind of research provides for potential candidates for a place7
at the nexus of the current economics debate.  Therefore, we may choose research of this kind
for exemplifying the "economic view" of U. S. - Japanese trade relations and the role of
"economic fundamentals" therein.
One example of an economic analysis including the description of some Japanese
"economic fundamentals" is Grossman's (1990) paper.  Grossman set out to "explain Japan's
innovation and trade [through] a model of quality competition and dynamic comparative
advantage."  From the outset, Grossman discounts other "non-economic" explanations of
Japan's economic development and follows instead Saxonhouse's (1986) arguments of factor
endowments as basic determinants of trade.  However, he takes the argument serious that
Japan's performance cannot be understood with reference to static notions of comparative
advantage alone, and quotes Freeman (1987) as a proponent of an important role of a broadly
defined concept of "technology."
16  He then goes along to integrate technological research and
development (R&D) into an analytical framework leaving the relative endowments of skilled
labor as economic fundamentals that remain largely unexplained.  His analytical model is
basically Neoclassical, especially with respect to postulated market clearing in the markets for
labor and other resources.  It deviates from (or advances the) Neoclassical framework with
respect to incorporating dynamically changing comparative advantages in high-technology
industries.  This is done by introducing an imperfectly competitive high-technology sector and
the possibility to increase the quality of its products through research and development
(R&D), which requires skilled labor.  The policy results derived are driven by the tradeoff
between labor use for R&D and labor use for the production of goods, given initial
endowments.  Grossman comes to conclusions including, for example, that Japan, "as the
country with the greater relative endowments of skilled labor compared to natural resources[,]
will develop over time a comparative advantage in the high-technology sector.
17  The question
arises, of course, where the historically grown relative abundance of skilled labor in Japan
comes from. On first blush, it seems that an answer would require an inquiry into social
dynamics of the Japanese society.  I will introduce such an inquiry below when discussing
Johnson's work.  Given a general notion of the complexity of an economy actually situated in
a real society, one might surmise that Grossman's work could not only be unraveled by8
questioning assumptions about initial endowments, but also by questioning the accuracy of the
model design.  This line of critique is exemplified in what follows.
In another paper on dynamic comparative advantage, Grossman together with
Helpman (1990) set out again to model growth within a dynamic trade model driven by
endogenous technological progress resulting from entrepreneurs' profit-maximizing behavior.
This model was based on a framework developed earlier by Romer (1986) and makes
reference to Grossman's (1990) work introduced above.  The resulting presentation included
the consequences on growth and R&D into a trade model examining tariffs and subsidies on
final goods and subsidies on R&D in a two-country environment.  In particular, technological
growth was modeled endogenously, the effects of different factor endowments have been
explored, and the significance of the degree of knowledge spillovers between countries has
been demonstrated.  In doing this, the model continues along the lines of building a synthesis
of growth and (static) trade issues.  The results derived from this synthesis build an attempt to
formally link (short-run) trade policies, such as tariffs and subsidies, to long-run world-growth
issues.  However, even when staying within the economics paradigm, this assessment would
have to be qualified with regard to both the model specifications used and the results derived.
As usual, the authors sought their analysis clear and tractable by exercising prudence in model
design.  But some of the (simplifying) assumptions may affect the results derived in a crucial
way.  These assumptions are: 1) identical, homothetic preferences across countries;  2)
innovations are not tradable between countries;  3) markets for final goods are competitive;  4)
No "overlapping research" or patent races - each country develops only new goods that are not
available in the other country;  5) governments collect and redistribute tariff revenues by use
of lump-sum taxes and subsidies.  All of these assumptions have the potential to greatly
restrict the range of possible analytical results.  But one assumption that stands out in this
regard is nontradability of innovation between countries.  Centrally based on this assumption
is the authors' conclusion that stronger relative demand for final goods in the country with the
comparative advantage in R&D slows long-run growth of the world economy by lowering this
countries share in the development of new products.  If this assumption is abandoned, quite
different results may emerge.  In particular, firms will emerge producing goods that have been9
developed by the other country.  One country's R&D will not solely be determined by the
same country's profitability of producing goods.  Hence, this country's share in developing
products may not decline, and world economic growth may not slow down.  But this example
is just one example of an assertion about a state of affairs that could be regarded as highly
dependent on social and institutional factors.  Consequently, I will continue with exploring the
"Political view."
4.  A "Political" View
Johnson
18 explicitly rejects the analytical approaches taken by economists.  He frankly
states:
19
"In talking about economic issues in the Asia-Pacific region, one must begin by largely
discounting or ignoring the opinions of economics professors in English-speaking
countries."
Even though admitting that he, of course, is arguing against economists because he is a
political scientist of trade, he largely continues along the stated lines of argument by noting
that U. S. - Japanese trade is a managed, bilateral game where the two players are inherently
different.  Consequently, he challenges the validity of economic axioms and assumptions used
in the U. S. for the case of Japan.  This view, called "revisionism", holds that "Japan's
economy and society are not organized around classical notions of free markets, in which the
direction of the economy is determined by the independent actions of consumers and
corporations all operating to maximize their profits and incomes."
20
Hence, from the point of view of an economist
21, the first distinctive impression of
Johnson's theory of state and economy is one that is defined negatively - his is not the theory
of an economics professor.  He clarifies this point by asserting that:
"[economists] are today concerned more with defending their arcane theories than with
studying the nature and potentialities of Asian capitalism."10
Directly following these statements, however, Johnson allows, if only hypothetically, for the
possibility that these "arcane theories of English-speaking professors" are valid.  He confirms
that:
"... at the heart of the various economic disputes between Japan and the United States
is what theory applies and whether the East Asian and North American capitalist
economies even belong to the same species.  The answer has direct implications for
policy.  If the two economies belong to the same species of capitalism, then there is
every reason to suppose that problems might be solved ... through such measures as
macroeconomic coordination, ..."
But he immediately expresses his doubts about this possibility by suggesting that economic
coordination attempts since the Plaza Accord in 1985 made things worse rather than better,
implying that the two forms of capitalism are indeed different.  Where the economic point of
view presents one, universally valid characterization of economic structures, Johnson assumes
there are two, presumably equally valid.  This implies differences in the philosophical
foundations of the two views, since Johnson's view suggests that there can be a rightful place
for two fundamentally different economic systems.  It also opens up the possibility to consider
a different set of behavioral assumptions about individuals (psychological) and about the
interaction between individuals (sociological) that are the micro units of this economic
system.  Whereas the "economic" view insists on one philosophical foundation, a natural
equilibrium outcome in a largely homogeneous world with similar economic, sociological and
psychological underpinnings, Johnson philosophy affirms the validity of two conflicting value
systems leading to awareness of two fundamentally different socio-economic systems, where a
harmonic equilibrium situation does not necessarily arise.  Similarly, his political theory is
based on the awareness of conflict through otherness, rather than identical goals in relative
harmony.  From the "economic" point of view, conflict is possible about a material outcome,
but it will have to be resolved by using strategies defined within the Western economic
paradigm.
At the onset of his presentation, Johnson started out with a direct reference to the mode
of economic analysis.  However, in his paper, he first lays a historical foundation before11
covering economic matters.  He starts with the observation, that the end of the Cold War has
enabled Japan to reevaluate her position towards the alliance with the United States.  The
same possibility, or rather necessity, arose for the United States.  Johnson refers to Francis
Fukuyama (1989) and Alan Tonelson (1991) as proponents of two conflicting views
concerning the U. S. - Japanese alliance.  In Johnson's opinion, Fukuyama comes close to the
official American position in stressing Japan's similarities and common interests with the
United States.  On the other hand, Tonelson, whom Johnson calls a "neorealist", is closer to
the official Japanese position that the present alliance was largely based on necessity and
convenience when counteracting the "common Soviet threat."  In the course of pursuing such
policies, the U. S. had "smothered" Japan's foreign policy and her independence.
Consequently, Tonelson hold a drift toward more regionalism likely, rather than continued U.
S. - Japanese ties on old terms.  Johnson sees in these differences of the official positions in
Washington and Tokyo a major potential for conflict.  In his words:
"... it is reasonable to conclude that during the 1990s Japan and the U. S. are on a
collision course."
22
He concludes that in order to avoid a "collision", both countries will have to initiate reform.
His following analysis concentrates on three key points.  Namely, the New World Order, the
movement from GATT toward economic regionalism, and the problem of "emotional friction"
(kanjo no atsureki) between Americans and Japanese.
In short, the Japanese position on the New World Order is that a) the U. S. has lost a
lot of its economic influence and strength, b) the nations of the world are becoming more
dependent on each other, c) the U. S. still acts as if they were in an unchallenged leadership
role.  The last point has special importance with respect to U. S. attempts to claim moral
leadership and exert "foreign pressure" (gaiatsu) on Japan.  The rationale for a movement from
GATT to economic regionalism could stem from these considerations alone
23, even without
taking into account any frictions evolving from a continued clash of cultures.  Animosity
towards the U. S. arises from the notion that the American domestic demise does not put the
U. S. into the position of a strong role model fit for moral leadership.  Johnson states, that
Japanese opinion tends overwhelmingly toward viewing the U. S. as a nation in gradual12
decline.  In light of this, American demands on Japan, such as during the Gulf Crisis, are not
well taken.  On the contrary, they are viewed as unwelcome and unjustified gaiatsu.
Japan now tries to redefine her role according to her own terms.  This is especially true
for the realm of economics, where many Japanese writers now begin to acknowledge major
structural differences between the United States and Japan.  An often discussed example of
these differences is, of course, keiretsu, but there are also others such as administrative
guidance or structural corruption.  Johnson forwards the opinion that structural economic
differences need not in themselves be an obstacle to economic exchange, as long as they are
recognized.  The acknowledgment of such differences, however, puts the Japanese - American
relationship on "a new ideological footing, one that in [Johnson's] opinion is more realistic
than the old one and that will have to abandon the condescending efforts of American gaiatsu
to force the Japanese to reform their economy using the American economy as a model."
24
As a bottom line, it may be concluded that the "political" view explicitly acknowledges
the existence of two fundamentally different socio-economic systems, whereas the "economic"
mode of analysis bases a detailed economic theory on the assumption of a basically identical
socio-economic system.  A more detailed discussion of the relation between the two views
follows in the next, and final, chapter.
5.  An "Economic and Political" Mode of Analysis
The need for a reconsideration of economic theory has been repeatedly advocated over
time both by economists and non-economists.  The reasons given range from economists'
changing perceptions of the international economy that challenge their previous assumptions
about self-adjusting perfect markets over the accusation that traditional trade theory was built
with a pre-conceived result in mind to the need to a radical change in paradigm.  The
criticisms on economic theory can be described as having two major concerns.  One is the lack
of elements that explain evolutionary change, and the other is the notion that the economic
discipline concentrates in a myopic fashion on the economic subsystem taking the social value13
system and institutional environment as given.  Fritjof Capra, physicist and philosopher, has
expressed both concerns very pointedly:
25
" An economy is a continually changing and evolving system, dependent on the
changing ecological and social systems in which it is embedded.  To understand it we
need a conceptual framework that is also capable of change and continual adaption to
new situations.  Such a framework is sadly lacking in the work of most contemporary
economists, who ... are increasingly out of touch with current economic reality."
And:
"The evolution of a society, including the evolution of its economic system, is closely
linked to changes in the value system that underlies all its manifestations.  The values
a society lives by will determine its world view and religious institutions, its scientific
enterprise and technology, and its political and economic arrangements.  ...  The study
of values is thus of paramount importance for all social sciences; there can be no such
thing as a 'value-free' social science.  ...  Any 'value-free' analysis of social phenomena
is based on the tacit assumption of an existing value system that is implicit in the
selection and interpretation of data.  ..."
Capra hints already at another major complication introduced by considering value and belief
systems as fundamentally shaping the analysis.  In a different context
26, Catherine MacKinnon
has identified this problem area as the need for questioning the way we acquire and process
knowledge.  If Capra would have been using her terminology, he may very well have stated
that it is necessary to engage economics and economic policy on the level of epistemology.
Pomery states that the way we describe the current situation in trade theory depends on the
type of philosophy of science that we espouse."
27  Pomery continues by discussing philosophy
as science in terms of "Foundationalism" versus "Non-Foundationalism:"
"In its crudest form, the problem of Foundationalism can be summarized as follows:
(a) as practical beings, we need to make decisions (about beliefs, actions, values, et
cetera); (b) we do not know how to make decisions without introducing 'foundational'
beliefs to underpin those decisions; (c) all attempts to build a credible position to
justify those foundations, whether in Mathematics, Analytical Philosophy, or Science,14
appear to be seriously inadequate; (d) yet we can make no sense of a pure 'anti-
foundationalist' world."
He understands the move toward foundationalism up to the 1920s as the natural climax of
Enlightenment, and observes that the past sixty years have seen a continual weakening of the
foundationalist position.  The positive-normative theory distinction together with strong
emphasis on empirical testing is one major offshoot of the foundationalist position.
In my opinion, Pomery addresses a key point underlying the divergence of the
presented "economic" and "political" views.  Expressed simply, this point lies in comparing a
"foundationalist" position and an "anti-foundationalist" position by describing them as
subscribing to a two-step scientific procedure and a four-step scientific procedure,
respectively.
28  The two-step procedure involves first, to describe the world in a neutral, value-
free manner, followed by the second step of a value judgment or choice of "how the world
should be."  The four-step procedure involves the steps:  a) choice of perspective,  b) choice of
description,  c) value judgment or choice of "how the world should be,"  and  d) policy
prescription or assertion of "how the world could be."
On first impression, the two-step procedure seems to resemble the mode of analysis of
the "economic" view, and the four-step procedure seems to resemble the model of analysis of
the "political" view.  But even though the "political" view looks broader to someone critical of
the "economic" view since it complements the latter in many ways, it still is based on
somewhat arbitrarily chosen foundations based on an incomplete view of the world.  It also
may lack the depth of technical analysis of economic mechanisms often provided by the
"economic" view.  Hence, the "economic" view may complement the "political."  The
difference in focus and methodological rigor of the two views is due to the fundamentally
different nature of the respective problems addressed.  The "economic" aspects of a particular
trade policy issue are often much more clearly defined and well-structured than the "political"
aspects.  Yet all have to be considered in order to reach policy-relevant conclusions.
Does Pomery think, there is a possible reconciliation for these two views?  He doesn't
give a clear answer to that question, but he declares that there is certainly no obvious way to
reach such a reconciliation.  He states:
2915
"It would be nice to unveil a bottom line to the discussion.  However there should be
enough evidence so far to suggest that the cost of achieving any bottom line is to
ignore some potentially-important aspects of the situation.  The view here is that there
is no unambiguous trade policy, and there are good reasons to expect failure of closure
in such a debate."
The debate Pomery refers to is about finding unambiguous foundations for trade theory.  With
respect to less fundamental goals, I would argue that there is clear reason for optimism.
Integrating both views wherever practicable may greatly reduce existing ambiguity of trade
policy.  Pomery observes that "[e]conomists' knowledge of the international economy has
increased"
30 and that phenomena such as intra-industry trade, scale economies, and imperfect
competition are all better understood.  This has led to changing perceptions of the
international economy.  Many of the factors now understood had been mentioned in the past
by critics, such as Capra or Robinson, as elements lacking from economic analysis.
Obviously, some flow of information between the proponents of different views takes place.
Grossman's work shows, after all, that he has taken up the challenge to further a dynamic
description of the economy.  Moreover, more recent contributions such as Baldwin (1994) or
Grossman and Helpman (1994) have taken up aspects of "politics" in the shaping of trade
policy.  Interdisciplinary work linking different cultural and institutional environments to
innovation has been forwarded, for example, by Albach (1994).16
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characteristics described, it seems clear that "New Neoclassical" and "New Classical" theories are the same.
15Felderer and Homburg (1987), p. 209.
16Grossman (1990) notes that frequent criticism on previous economic analyses centered around the static nature
of the (Heckscher-Ohlin) theory of trade which was by design not capable of explaining the growth performance
of a country like Japan.  Japan's growth would be more adequately described by a Schumpeterian process.
17Grossman (1990), p. 98.
18In a speech delivered on November 5, 1991 at Purdue University.
19Johnson (1991), pp. 17, 18.
20Johnson took this definition from Peter Ennis.
21Naturally, my analysis starts from an economist's view point.
22Johnson (1991), Footnote omitted.
23A corollary to this is Japan's concern to become disadvantaged through provisions of future bilateral trade
agreements such as that between U. S. and Mexico.  It is understood, that the weaker U. S. position makes the
emergence of such agreements more likely.
24Johnson (1991), p. 22.
25Capra (1982), p. 190.  Footnote omitted.
26MacKinnon (1989), pp. ix and 106, in an attempt to lay the foundations of a feminist theory of the state.
27Pomery (1990), pp. 20, 21.  Footnotes omitted.
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29Pomery (1990), p. 40.
30Pomery (1990), p. 16.2008
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